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1. Luxemburg
Luxemburg has no university. As a result, those who have a professional
interest in philosophy are obliged to make their academic career elsewhere.
In this connection, the name of Jean Greisen (1942-), by now professor at
the Institut Catholique in Paris, might be mentioned here. A very produc-
tive author. Greisen is influenced by many present-day continental philos-
ophers (a.o. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida). He has a
special interest in hermeneutics, and applies post-modern hermeneutic
theories to the reading of religious texts. These texts don't have one fixed
meaning, but are involved in an on-going process of interpretation. Thus,
from the perspective of the religious believer, inspiration and revelation
should also be seen as ever on-going rather than as past events.'
1. Belgium1
1) General situation: With regard to Belgium we are in the happy situation
that the history and the actuality of its philosophical life has been meticu-
lously described in an eight-volume work of C.E.M, Struyker Boudier. In
fact, Struyker Boudier's encyclopedic survey covers the philosophical work
that has been done not only in Belgium but also in the Netherlands and
I Cf. Jean Grcisch. L'Age herméneutique de la Raison (Paris 1985); cf. on Greisch C.E.M.
Struyker Boudier, Op zoek naar lin en zijn (Wijsgerig leven in Nederland, België en Luxem-
burg VH) (Nijmegen 1992), 352-354.
I1 am indebted to Prof. W.A. de Pater and Prof. I. Verhack for their kind verbal infor-
mation on the backgrounds of philosophy of religion in Belgium. I also thank Prof, de Pater
for commenting on an earlier verstört of the Belgium-section of this paper.
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Luxemburg from 1880 until 1990 by thousands of scholars, with up to now
only one restriction: it focuses exclusively on the Roman Catholic world.3
As a result, it gives a more complete description of philosophy in Belgium
than in the Netherlands, since in the Netherlands Catholicism has been only
one of the dominant confessional forces.
Since more than a century an essential role in Belgian philosophical life
is played by the Institute for Philosophy4 in Louvain (Leuven). This aca-
demic institute, erected in 1889 on papal instructions by the universal
scholar and later Cardinal Désiré Mercier (1851-1926), was the centre of
the neo-thomistic revival in the low countries. In the course of time it
developed into the most important centre for the Belgian study of philos-
ophy in general. Its many professors and lecturers teach at all faculties of
Louvain University. Still keeping its broadly catholic orientation, it pro-
vides room for the study of many modern and post-modern philosophers of
both continental and analytical traditions. There is a rather strong accent
on descriptive and historical studies. In general, the Benelux has functioned
more as a centre of import and export, reception and development, of phil-
osophical theories from abroad than as a breeding-place of original philo-
sophical genius. Nevertheless, the study of present-day French, German,
and more recently also Anglo-American philosophers at the Institute is also
turned to use for the elaboration of creative and original philosophical
contributions. For many years the Institute has been attracting students and
scholars from many countries for research and teaching purposes.
As for the philosophy of religion, this was not recognized in Belgium as
a separate subject until the nineteen twenties.5 This was caused by the fact
that philosophy of religion was seen as a secular and therefore unwelcome
alternative to natural or philosophical theology, a discipline which was
3 The title of the series is Wijsgerig leven in Nederland en België 1SSO-19SO; on some
volumes, the name of Luxemburg is also added. The eight volumes appeared from 1985-1992
in Leuven, Nijmegen and Baani In the last volume. Katholieken en hun filosofie (Nijmegen
1992), 63, Struyker Boudier announces further studies on the philosophical work of protestant
and non-confessional authors in the Benelux. In what follows on the philosophy of religion
in Belgium, I have profited much from Struyker Boudier's books.
4 Institut supérieur de PhdosophielHoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte; from the twenties,
the Dutch language was also used in teaching, and gradually became to play a more important
role. The University of Louvain (1425} was re-erected in 1835 as a free catholic university.
In 1968 it was split into a Dutch-speaking university in Flanders and a French-speaking one
in Wallony (Louvain-la-Neuve). As a result, the Institute was also split into two sections.
5 U. Dhondt, 'Filosofie en godsdienst'. Tijdschrift voor filosofie (1991), 3-22.
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firmly embedded in classical metaphysics. In the philosophy of religion,
not God but religion is the central theme of reflection. But if the divine
reality can only be grasped in the attitude of faith, how can (secular) phil-
osophy judge in matters of meaning and truth in religion? This was the
question the First professor for (among other things) philosophy of religion,
Mgr. Léon Noël, asked. Noël was appointed at the theological faculty of
Louvain University in 1921, and taught the subject besides his work at the
Institute until 1942.6
Still, the philosophy of religion hardly has an independent academic
status in Belgium. Many individual philosophers have been engaged in the
study of religious themes, and have developed creative insights and theories
in this connection; others directed their attention to the empirical study of
concrete religions in order to draw apologetic conclusions about their truth
and falsity in relation to the Catholic faith. Still more philosophers and
theologians have been involved in the traditional project of offering philo-
sophical/metaphysical grounds for belief in God (e.g. Dominicans like De
Fetter and Walgrave). They try to show in different ways that human exist-
ence is characterized by a transcendental openness towards God. But
usually these different projects and activities are not considered as belong-
ing to the discipline of 'philosophy of religion'. So the otherwise safe
criterion that everything is philosophy of religion which presents itself as
such does not yield much in this context. Nor has any approach established
itself as a dominant tradition.
As to the protestant side (not covered by Struyker Boudier's survey),
philosophy of religion has been part of the teaching programme in the only
protestant theological faculty, which is based in Brussels, ever from its
beginning.7 Here we find a similar situation as in the Catholic institutions:
philosophy of religion is usually assigned together with some three to five
other disciplines to one professor. When he or she departs and is suc-
ceeded, the division of the teaching areas may be changed depending on
the interests of the new staff. As a result, philosophy of religion has been
practised only when people decided to concentrate in their research on this
6 Slruyker Boudier, De filosofie van Leuven (Wijsgerig leven V) (Leuven 1989), 147-152
(esp. 149); id.. Katholieken en hun filosofie (Wijsgerig leven Vffl) (Nijmegen 1992), 93.
7 The Faculté universitaire de théologie protestante was founded in 1950, its Dutch-
speaking section, the Universitaire faculteit voor protestantse godgeleerdheid in 1954.
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specific part of their task. So here too much depends on the creative inter-
est of individuals.
2) Individual philosophers: Without claiming completeness, I therefore
would like to mention some individual philosophers and theologians whose
work is interesting from the perspective of philosophy of religion. I start
in Louvain. Until recently, the philosophy of religion was officially taught
here by F.D. Vansina (1925), who has published mainly on the philosophy
of Paul Ricoeur8; at this moment it is taught by Ignace Verhack (1944). In
1975 Verhack wrote a dissertation on the mystical dimension in Wittgen-
stein's Tractatus9, and in a number of later publications he opposes the
usurpation of religious belief by critical reason. Religious belief is a cat-
egory sui generis, and only if philosophy respects this fact it can fruitfully
reflect on religion. At this moment, Verhack is inspired by work of the
French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion, who separates God from the classical
concept of being. Influence of Wittgenstein is also visible in the work of
A. Burms and H. de Dijn. In their book on 'rationality and its limits' they
defend a non-cognitive interpretation of religion. Religion has to do with
the quest for meaning, and as such it has an irreplaceable function in cul-
ture and society. It does not, however, deal with knowledge of facts; it has
no propositional content, although in the end it may evoke a reality which
transcends our experience.10
Verhack's predecessor Antoine Vergote has become well-known most of
all as a psychologist of religion. Nevertheless, writing on the borderline of
psycho-analysis, cultural anthropology and philosophy, his many contribu-
tions on the nature and functions of religious belief, pertain to the philos-
ophy of religion as well. Over against the freudian reduction of religion to
a psychic complex, Vergote holds fast to an ontological dimension and to
the notion of truth in religion. The quest for God as reflected in religious
images, symbols and stories refers to our being addressed as human beings
' But cf. his Philosophy of Religion. Absence and Presence of Cod, Leuven 1971, 1973:;
according to Vansina, the mystery of being in the end has a personal character.
9 Cf. his 'Wittgenstein's Deictic Metaphysics: An Uncommon Reading of the Tractatus',
International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978), 433-444.
10 A. Bums & H. de Dijn, De rationaliteit en haar grenzen: Kritiek en deconstructie
(Leuven 1986); cf. the critica] review of another professor for philosophy at the Institute,
Carlos Steel, 'Inzicht en zingeving', Tijdschrift voor filosofie 49 (1987), 297-307.
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by the Other. The question is how to distinguish between healthy and un-
healthy forms of religious belief. In this connection it is important that
from an anthropological point of view we humans are eccentric rather than
narcistic beings.
Classical problems concerning the relation between faith and reason have
been dealt with by (among others) U. Dhondt, A. Léonard and M. Moors
from the background of modern continental philosophy, especially from
Kant and Hegel. In general, speculative philosophy from Aquinas to Hegel
has been much more influential in Belgium than the analytic tradition. The
most notable exception here is W.A. de Pater (1930-; in fact, De Pater is
a Dutchman by birth), who combines his thomist orientation with an
equally thorough acquaintance with British analytical philosophy. From
1968 until 1994 he was a professor at the Institute as well as at the Theo-
logical Faculty of Tilburg in the Netherlands (in 1970 the Tilburg chair was
made extraordinary when he became an ordinary professor at the Institute).
His many writings concentrate on logic, the philosophy of language and the
philosophy of religion. More particularly, his main interest is in religious
language. De Pater borrows the key notion of his thinking on this subject
from Ian T. Ramsey, viz. the notion of 'disclosure'. According to Ramsey's
thesis, religious language is rooted in disclosure-situations and seeks to
evoke disclosures. It is not empirically, but evocatively descriptive. A
disclosure is being st(r)uck by something, suddenly seeing its deeper mean-
ing. Usually this happens by means of qualified models, i.e. by means of
common sense images which are extended beyond their usual limits, and
point towards a transcending reality. In this way, an (aha-)experience might
be evoked of e.g. the real nature of God's might. For clearly from the
standpoint of both scientific and everyday speech, religious language is a
peculiar language with its own logic." De Pater connects this theory with
the thomistic doctrine of analogy, which gives his views a more realistic
stamp than Ramsey's. Both are engaged, however, in the project of eluci-
dating the linguistic and conceptual dimensions of religious belief. Remark-
" W.A. de Pater, Analogy, Disclosures and Narrative Theology (Leuven 1988), 40-42;
this is his most comprehensive English study of Che theme, next to various Dutch and German
contributions, of which especially Reden von Gort: Reflexionen zur analytischen Philosophie
der religiösen Sprache (Bonn 1974, 19882) should also be mentioned here. See for De Pater's
view on the nature of philosophy of religion his 'Filosofie van tie godsdienst', Wijsgerig
Perspectief 13 (1972-1973), 348-352.
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ably, up till now De Pater does not seem to have found many Belgian
followers in this approach to philosophy of religion.
A second example of a philosopher who let himself be influenced by
analytical philosophy and its theological applications is the Walloon Jean
Ladrière (1921-). Apart from his numerous contributions on widely diver-
gent branches of science and philosophy (mathematics, epistemology, social
ethics, political theory etc.), Ladrière also wrote extensively on the place
of the Christian faith in a scientific world. Following Wittgenstein and
Donald Evans, he emphasized the performative character of the language
of faith. In his work on religion he combined the new analytical insights
with the spiritual dimensions of speculative philosophy. Thus, he incorpor-
ates in his thinking influences of philosophers such as Husserl, Hegel and
Whitehead.12
The mentioning of Whitehead brings us to the figure of Jan van der
Veken (1932-), who is no doubt Whiteheads most vigorous protagonist in
Belgium if not in Europe.13 Van der Veken is professor at the Institute for
fundamental philosophy, epistemology and the philosophical doctrine of
God (since 1969), director of the Institute's 'centre for metaphysics and the
philosophical doctrine of God', and president of the European Society for
Process Thought. Van der Veken regards process thought as a promising
kind of metaphysics, because on the one hand it is not affected by the
collapse of traditional onto-theology and on the other hand it provides us
with a more realistic view of God than much continental philosophy (e.g.
Levinas). As the dynamic ground (the 'final cause') of reality, God in-
cludes the universe in an organic way and lures it towards more harmony.
Moreover, according to Van der Veken process metaphysics offers new
chances for a fruitful dialogue between faith and science, theology and
cosmology, because it is perfectly in line with modern physics.14 Before his
turn to process thinking, Van der Veken studied phenomenological philos-
ophy (especially Merleau-Ponty), which he found to leave hardly any room
for philosophical theology in the sense of rational talk about God.
1! Cf. J. Ladrière, Language and Belief (Dublin 1972).
13 Cf. e.g. his 'Process Thought in Contemporary Europe: Belgium', Process Studies 9
(1979), 10-13; his Proces-denken: Een oriëntatie (Leuven 1983); and his translation of White-
head's Religion in the Making: De dynamiek van de religie (Kapellen 1988).
14 1. van der Veken, Een kosmos om m te leven (Kapellen 1990).
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Finally, one protestant philosopher of religion should be mentioned: the
Hungarian theologian Attila Szekeres, who taught the subject at the theo-
logical faculty of Brussels from 1954 until his death in 1974. Szekeres
strived for what he called a theological philosophy of religion as distinct
from a philosophical philosophy of religion. This theological philosophy
of religion on the one hand has to do justice to the specific character and
message of the Scriptures, and on the other hand has to take the indepen-
dence of philosophy seriously. Because of this second requirement, a dia-
logue with philosophical philosophy of religion becomes possible and
desirable; for both theology and philosophy remain fundamentally human
enterprises, and neither the philosopher nor the theologian has a monopoly
on truth.15 There is some similarity between Szekeres' ideas on the nature
and task of philosophy of religion and the Utrecht approach of the disci-
pline as will be described below.
3. The Netherlands
1) Historical developments: Traditionally, the study of the philosophy of
religion in the Netherlands has taken place at the theological faculties of
the State Universities. The date of its official introduction at the by then
three theological faculties (Leiden, Groningen, Utrecht) can be given with
precision: 1 October 1877. In the previous year a Higher Education Act
was accepted, which regulated the separation of state- and church-responsi-
bilities in theological education. The act was the result of a growing insight
during the preceding decades that the state should not and could not bear
responsibility for the academic training of theologians of one particular
church (viz. the broadly calvinist Dutch Reformed Church). Rather, as far
as possible it should remain neutral and impartial in theological matters.
Therefore, the state universities should not teach those subjects which are
closely affiliated with the confessional perspective and practical needs of
a particular church, such as dogmatics and practical theology. Despite
discussions about changing the name of the theological faculty, it kept its
15 A. Szekeres, De structuur van de filosofische theologie (Den Haag 1961); cf. his 'Voor
een eerherstel van de godsdienstwijsbegeerte' (= 'Plea for a rehabilitation of the philosophy
of religion'), in: A. Szekeres, Heil en elan (Amsterdam 1974), 91-105; Szekeres also wrote
appreciative articles on Karl Earth's view of philosophy of religion, but iî seems that he
himself was more influenced by Emil Brunner, on whom he wrote his dissertation.
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traditional name ('faculteit der godgeleerdheid'); in practice, however, it
became restyled as a department of religious studies, with special attention
to the Christian religion.16
In this connection, a change in the curriculum of the restyled faculties
meant the birth of philosophy of religion as an academic discipline: the
subject of natural theology was transformed into two disciplines, viz. the
history of the doctrine of God (which to my knowledge did not survive
anywhere as a separate discipline) and the philosophy of religion. The
latter was supposed to replace the systematic aspect of natural theology,
and to conform to the academic standards of critical reasoning. The respon-
sibility for the training of church ministers was in turn bestowed on the
various churches; they were invited to appoint their own professors for so-
called 'confessional' subjects like dogmatics and practical theology, who
came to work next to the state professors at the different faculties. Since
1876 the state and different churches closely cooperate in this duplex ordo.
as it is officially called.
Apart from the public universities (by now four in number, Amsterdam's
Athenaeum having been made a municipal university in 1877), philosophy
of religion is also being taught at the theological faculties of the so-called
'special universities', viz. the (Calvinistic) Free University of Amsterdam
(1880) and the Catholic University of Nijmegen (1923). These were erected
by associations affiliated to churches which did not want to see their stu-
dents being educated by the state. Because of the simplex ortfo-structure of
the theological faculties at these universities, the philosophy of religion had
a less firm place in the curriculum. Nevertheless, in Nijmegen it has been
part of an official teaching post at the theological faculty from its begin-
ning in 1Θ23; the Free University has a chair for philosophy of religion
since 1959.
ιΐ Otto J. de Jong, 'De wetgever van i 876 en de theologie1, Nederlands Archief voor
Kerkgeschiedenis 48 (1968), 313-332; Interestingly, philosopher of religion G.E. Meuleman
endorses the view of J.H. Gunning jr. that the Act, being the result of a compromise, does not
explicitly state that the reshaped faculties should be based on the principle of free research
rather than on confessional/revelational premises; according to him, de jure it remains possible
for those appointed at the faculties to do their work from a specifically Christian perspective.
See his De Godgeleerdheid volgens de Wet op het Hoger Onderwijs van IS76 (Amsterdam
1982), 20. R. van den Broek. 'Het goed recht van een faculteit der Godgeleerdheid aan de
openbare universiteit', in: F.G.M. Broeyer & T. van Wiïligenburg (eds.), Facultas Theologien:
Soror sororum! (Utrecht 1994), 13-32, rejects this point of view.
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In I960 a new Act on Academic Education intended to strengthen the
coherence of the different academic disciplines taught at the state univer-
sities, and therefore laid down that the philosophical aspects of each disci-
pline should be studied in a 'central inter-faculty', to which also the study
of philosophy as such was delegated. Some theological faculties protested
against the eventual transfer of philosophy of religion into these inter-fac-
ulties, arguing that philosophy of religion was a genuinely theological
discipline. When in 1963 the act was given concrete form in an Academic
Statute, the government decided to appoint the professors in the philosophy
of religion both at the theological faculty and at the central inter-faculty,
rather than to move them to the latter. In this way a 'Streit der Fakultäten'
was avoided. Since, at the state universities philosophy of religion can be




philosophical faculties.17 In 1964 the Free University decided to follow
the example of the state universities in this respect. fu«1·*^ <χΧ( **i\)tu*
Apart from the public and special universities, theology is also taught at
an academic level by a number of 'commissioned institutions'. These insti-
tutions were established seminaries or schools for the ministry/priesthood
of different churches. Nowadays, they are entitled to call themselves uni-
versities even though most of them don't teach any other subject than
theology. As to the Catholic ones, philosophy of religion is usually part of
the broader philosophical training which underlies the classical theological
education. As to the protestant ones, I do not know of any professional
work in the philosophy of religion being done there.
Let us now try to map the landscape of Dutch philosophy of religion in
a more or less systematic way by looking at the respective universities
were philosophy of religion is being taught, starting with the eldest and
ending with the youngest. In this way, it may be possible to describe brief-
ly some local traditions. In doing this for reasons of space I shall have to
skip many interesting work which has been and is being done, and concen-
trate especially on how philosophy of religion is conceived of and exer-
cised methodologically.
17 J.A. Oosterbaan, 'Wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst', in: W.F. Dankbaar & M. de Jonge
(red.), fnieiding lot de theologische studie (Groningen 1965), 164f.
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2) Local traditions": In Leiden, philosophers of religion have understood
the genitive case in 'philosophy of religion' primarily as an objective geni-
tive. That is, in Leiden one tends to see philosophy of religion as a critical
arbiter in relation to religion, rationally assessing what can and especially
what cannot be believed with intellectual integrity. This critical tradition
in philosophy of religion is deeply embedded in what has been the general
atmosphere at the theological faculty for many centuries. Since 1876, the
chair of philosophy of religion has successively been occupied by J.H.
Scholten (1877-1881), L.W.E. Rauwenhoff (1881-1889), J.H. Gunning
(1889-1891), C.P. Tiele (1891-1899), W.B. Kristensen (1900-1915), K.H.
Roessingh (1916-1925), H.T. de Graaf (1926-1930), L.J. van Hoik (1931-
1963), H.J. Heering (1964-1978) and H.J. Adriaanse (1978-). The last three
of these professors belong(ed) to the Remonstrant brotherhood, -and lia t e
efaHig iimiiltnncoiiily at thff^toBenstnrnr-s^mHrai
maved from Amatcrdtun to Leiden before. Rauwenhoff wrote the first
Dutch introduction to the philosophy of religion; his death prevented him
from finishing its second part, but its first part, consisting of two volumes,
received international recognition and influence." Rauwenhoff explicitly
distinguished the task of philosophy of religion from that of dogmatics. The
latter task he saw as describing and justifying the belief claims of one
particular religion. The task of the philosopher of religion, on the other
hand, was to explain the psychological functions of religion-in-general and
to determine its value by means of a rational and moral judgment.20
Interesting is the story of Gunning and Tiele. Appointed in 1889, Gun-
ning tried to elaborate a philosophy of religion which was based on the
faith of the church community ('het geloof der gemeente'). In doing this,
however, he run into so much difficulties, that in 1891 he proposed an
18 In writing this section, I have profited from the three earlier comparative studies of
Dutch philosophy of religion which I have been able to find: A. Peperaak, 'Godsdienstfiloso-
fie in Nederland', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 32 (1978), 48-69; Henk van Luyk,
'Vormen van godsdienstfilosofie', Bijdragen 39 (1978), 350-398; HJ. Adriaanse, 'Godsdienst-
wijsgerig onderzoek in Nederland 1980-1990: Een overzicht', Nederlands Theologisch Tijd-
schrift 44 (1990), 308-331. Especially the latter essay offers an excellent survey, in which the
author gives fair and illuminating characterizations of widely divergent varieties of philosophy
of religion in the Netherlands.
" L.W.E. Rauwenhoff, Wijsbegeerte van den godsdienst (Laden 1887).
20 'De waardebepaling moet ontleend worden aan het redelijk en zedelijk oordeel'; Rau-
wenhoff, Wijsbegeerte, S. Cf. H. van Oyen, 'Wijsbegeerte der religie', in: H. van Oyen (ed.),
inleiding tot de theologische studie (Groningen 1946), 177.
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exchange of disciplines with his colleague Tiele. Tiele, who was a special-
ist in the history of religions, agreed, and thus Gunning came to teach the
history of the doctrine of God. Roessingh was the first one to teach philos-
ophy of religion as a separate subject, rather than connected with religious
studies.J' Both he and his successor De Graaf practised philosophy of
religion in combination with a strong theological and especially christo-
logical interest. At the end of Roessingh's (short) career, the influence of
Karl Barth became more and more manifest. In general the Leiden climate
became somewhat more friendly to the traditional church theology. The
consequences of this development we still find in the work of Heering, who
assigns an apologetic task to the philosophy of religion. Although he thinks
that philosophy, based on natural and autonomous reason, is unable to
produce knowledge of God, he nevertheless argues that the philosophy of
religion, rather than accepting the hypothesis 'God' as a presupposition,
should attempt to affirm it as a conclusion.22 In order to do this the phil-
osopher of religion should suspend the own prejudices and interpret the
meaning of religious data and interpretations of reality as objectively as
possible.23
Adriaanse, however, although also influenced by Barth2* and continuing
the more or less phenomenological method of Heering25, seems most of
all to revert to the views of Rauwenhoff. The 'rational and moral judgment'
has become a 'general truth-consciousness'26, but it still functions as an
external arbiter determining what can and especially what cannot be
21 In 1915 he was appointed as a lecturer for the philosophy of religion, a year Later as
a professor in philosophy of religion and ethics; cf. HJ. Heering, lln memoriam L.J. van
Hoik', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 36 (1982), 145:1 thank dr. Marcel Sarot for bring-
ing this note to ray attemion.
u 'He! is aan de godsdienstwijsbegeerte de hypothese "God" niet als onomstotelijke voor-
onderstelling te aanvaarden, maar haar zo mogelijk als conclusie te bevestigen'; H.J. Heering,
Inleiding tot de godsdienstwijsbegeerte (Meppel 1976), 126; cf. 165-179, and Peperzak, 'Gods-
dienstfilosofie', 63ff. It should be added that Heering subsequently utters his reservations
about the term 'hypothesis', which he considers as one-sidedly theoretical, downplaying the
existential and practical elements in (the philosophy of) religion.
21 Heering, Inleiding, 77, 82, 128; cf. Van Luyk. 'Vormen', 360f.
24 Cf. e.g. his 'Rezeption und Zukunft der Theologie Earths in religtonsphilosophischer
Sicht', Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie I I (1995), 247-262.
25 HJ. Adriaanse, Zu den Sachen selbst: Versuch einer Konfrontation der Theologie Karl
Earths mit der phänomenologischen Philosophie Edmund Husserts ('s Gravenhage 1974).
16 HJ. Adriaanse, 'Met God zonder "God"?', in: H.M. Vroom (ed.). De God van de
filosofen en de God van de Bijbel (Zoetenneer 1991), 98.
163
believed with integrity. In his latest book27, Adriaanse argues that as a
result the plausibility of the beliefs of Christianity has collapsed. There is
no natural knowledge of God, since God is beyond the reach of human
reason. And any appeal to revelation as a source of knowledge of God
should be treated with suspicion and critical distance. The philosophy of
religion is the critical substitute for the traditional locus de Deo. Any phil-
osopher who exchanges this attitude of critical distance for one of commit-
ment, is a bad philosopher. Theologians, on the other hand, may be existen-
tialîy involved in their discipline, if only they refrain from claims to Wis-
senschaftlichkeit. Only a non-cognitivist, non-realist interpretation of relig-
ion can avoid the severe criticism of Adriaanse's post-Kantian philosophy
of religion. In the end, it seems that Adriaanse's criticisms are inspired by
an implicit neo-positivist epistemology the historicity of which is
neglected; in any case, the recent shift towards post-modern epistemologies
is not assimilated or responded to at all.28
Some pupils of Adriaanse have analyzed important examples of religion
criticism in continental philosophy. Their conclusions are that speaking
about God can only be intelligible if it is done 'in pianissimo', articulating
the 'absolute difference' between God and our human conceptualities29;
and that theology can only be wissenschaftlich if it is conceived as relig-
ious studies.30
In Groningen the chair of philosophy of religion was held by G.H. Lamers
(1877-1883), I. van Dijk (1883-1917), AJ. de Sopper (1918-1922), WJ.
Aalders (1923-1942), H. van Oyen (1942-1947), H. de Vos (1948-1966),
H.G. Hubbeling (1967-1986) and R. Veldhuis (1990). Since the chair was
combined with one of ethics, some of its holders concentrated on ethics
rather than on the philosophy of religion. Van Oyen is a case in point here.
He was involved in the philosophy of religion only during a few years of
27 HJ. Adriaanse, Vom Christentum aus: Aufsätze und Vorträge zur Religionsphilosophie
(Kämpen 1995); the title is deliberately ambiguous, suggesting both 'starting from Christian-
ity' and 'moving away from Christianity'.
28 Cf. HJ. Adnaanse, H.A. Krop & L. Leertouwer, Hel verschijnsel theologie (Meppel
1987).
29 Hent de Vries. Theologie in pianissimo & Zwischen Rationalität und Dekonslruktion:
Die Aktualität der Denkfîguren Adornos und Levinas (Kämpen 1989).
30 Arie L. Molendijk, Aus dem Dunkle Ins Helle: Wissenschaft und Theologie im Denken
von Heinrich Scholl (Amsterdam 1991), 339.
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his academic career. In 1947, he went to teach ethics in Bazel, where in
1964 he took the initiative for the foundation of the Societal Ethica?'
Nevertheless, Van Oyen had a distinctive view on the nature and tasks of
philosophy of religion. He saw the genitive case as a subjective genitive,
and over against Rauwenhoff conceived the discipline as a distinctively
theological one. He even argued that it has 'a warmly pastoral character',
since it addresses questions concerning the relation between faith and rea-
son which many lay people ask. Rather than fideistically urging people to
believe what they do not understand, it helps them to reflect systematically
on the questions which Christian belief raises in its encounter with modern
culture. Especially, the relation between faith and knowledge is of central
importance for the philosophy of religion.32
Both this critical rationalist approach (to use present-day terminology33)
and this emphasis on epistemology have become characteristic of the Gro-
ningen tradition in philosophy of religion since the Second World War. As
to Härmen de Vos, they are visible e.g. in his descriptive study of the
classical arguments for the existence of God.34 A prolific and lucid author
who, apart from many other introductions in branches of (the history of)
philosophy and ethics, wrote two introductions in the philosophy of relig-
ion.35 He sees it as the primary task of the philosophy of religion to deter-
mine the essence of religion and to evaluate its truth-claims (which belong
to its essence). In order to fulfil these tasks adequately, philosophers of
religion themselves have to be religious, and to subscribe to the truth-
claims of religion. 'Faith is asked for' !36 An important value of the phil-
31 Jan Veenhof, Geist und Liebe: Die systematischen Voraussetzungen der Ethik Hendrik
van Oyens (Amsterdam 1978), 20.
32 Van Oyen, 'Wijsbegeerte der religie", in: H. van Oyen (ed.), Inleiding tot de theologi-
sche studie (Groningen 1946), 172-188, esp. 173. Interestingly, Van Oyen rejects an apolo-
getic understanding of the task of philosophy of religion, arguing in an anti-foundationahst
way that faith is no more in need of rational justification than love is.
3 Î I take critical rationalism as a middle way between fideism and strong rationalism. In
this way it Is defined and defended in the introduction to the philosophy of religion which is
used in Gromngen's introductory courses at this moment: M. Peterson e.a.. Reason and
Religious Belief (Oxford 1991), 41^t4.
M H. de Vos, De bewijzen voor Gods bestaan: Een systematisch-historische studie (Gro-
ningen 1971).
3! H. de Vos, Inleiding tot de wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst, Assen 1937; de Vos,
Wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst (Den Haag 1950).
36 De Vos, Wijsbegeerte van den godsdienst, 24f.; De Vos leaves implicit what is clear
from the context, viz. that by 'religion' he means the Chnstian religion.
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L
osophy of religion consists in its contribution to the apologetic task of
theology, not in vindicating religion before reason or in proving its truth,
but in rationally defending and explaining the Christian faith by searching
for traces of its truth both in reality and in the faith itself.
De Vos' description of philosophy of religion as the study of the essence
and the truth-claims of religion is found too in his successor Huib G. Hub-
beling's presentation of it as 'science of religion + the investigation of
truth or falsity'.37 Like De Vos, Hubbeling combined great philosophical
skills with a distinctive theological interest. But in contrast to De Vos,
Hubbeling also developed his views by means of a very specific method for
doing philosophy of religion, viz. his so-called logical-reconstructivist
method.38 In this method Hubbeling arranges different logical systems
according to their strictness. The stricter the system, the less axioms and
types of experiential data are allowed. Ethical intuition, aesthetical and
religious experience e.g. are only allowed as valid premises in less strict
systems. Hubbeling combined this meta-language of logical-empirical sys-
tems with a method of interpretation, which led him to reconstruct defec-
tive or ambiguous arguments of historical philosophers by tracing and
adapting their premises, thus making these arguments as strong as possible.
In this way, he logically reconstructed both the ontological arguments of
Anselm, Spinoza and Hartshorne and Kierkegaard's argument in Philoso-
phiske Smuler (1844).39 Hubbeling's preoccupation with epistemology,
criteria for verification etc. was fuelled by his appreciation and reception
of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy.40 By applying his method of logi-
cal reconstructivism to the classical arguments for the existence of God,
" H.G. Hubbeling, Principles of the Philosophy of Religion (Assen 1987), 3.
38 H.G. Hubbeling, Language, Logic and Criterion. A Defence of Non-positivistic Logical
Empiricism (Amsterdam 1971); cf. Andy F. Sanders, 'Huib Hubbelings logisch reconstructi-
visme en de Nederlandse godsdienstwijsbegeerte', in: A. van der Jagt & H.A. Krop (eds.),
Filosofie in Groningen 1914-1990 (Groningen 1996). For Hubbeling's bibliography, which
includes 11 books and 120 articles, see R. Veldhuis, A.F. Sanders & H.J. Siebrand (eds.),
Belief in Cod and Intellectual Honesty (Assen 1990), 185-195.
!' Hubbeling, Principles, 88-103, 217-219.
40 Hubbeling was not, however, the first Dutch philosopher of religion who recognized
the enormous importance of analytical philosophy for theology and philosophy of religion.
This was Wim F. Zuurdeeg, who taught analytical philosophy in Chicago until his death in
1963. Cf. W.F. Zuurdeeg, 'Wat kan de analytische filosofie voor de godsdienstphilosophie
betekenen?', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 10 (1955-56), 252-263; Zuurdeeg, An Ana-
lytical Philosophy of Religion (New York 1958).
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Hubbeling contributed to the rehabilitation of these arguments in present-
day Anglo-Saxon philosophy (by Plantinga, Hartshorne, Malcolm and
others).
At present, the Groningen tradition of research in religious episteraology
is continued by the senior lecturer Andy F. Sanders'", who wrote a disser-
tation on Michael Polanyi's post-critical epistemology. In this study San-
ders applies post-modern epistemological insights to the philosophy of
religion.41
Moving to Utrecht^, the chair for philosophy of religion here was suc-
cessively held by J.J. van Oosterzee (1877-1883), G.H. Laraers (who came
from Groningen: 1883-1903), H. Visscher (1903-1931), J. Severijn (1931-
1953), A.E. Loen (1955-1966) and V. Brümmer (1967-). As a result of a
reshuffle following the new Act of 1877, van Oosterzee was given the task
to teach philosophy of religion among other things, but in fact continued
to teach his old subjects (especially biblical and practical theology). Lamers
taught the philosophy of religion in combination with the history of relig-
ions and (since 1884) ethics. The appointment of Hugo Visscher as his
successor was politically motivated (he was a pupil of Abraham Kuyper,
by then Home Secretary). He as well as his successor Severijn, both ortho-
dox calvinists, were highly involved in state and church politics and wrote
little which could be counted as philosophy of religion.44
Loen, on the other hand, was a real academic philosopher. Already in his
dissertation he developed what would become his main thesis, viz. that the
way in which we approach philosophical questions depends in the end upon
41 Hubbeling's successor Veldhuis has deliberately limited himself to the ethics-part of
his chair. Moreover, a second lecturership for philosophy of religion besideiSanders at the
faculty seems to have been abandoned.
42 AndyF. Sanders, Michael F. Polanyi's Post-Critical Epistemology (Amsterdam 1988);
cf. esp. 247-264.
411 thank dr. A. de Groot for his bibliographical help in finding information on the
history of academic philosophy of religion in the Netherlands in general and in Utrecht in
particular.
44 H. Visscher, Geen îkeodicee (Utrecht 1910), in which he argues that there is such a
large epislerruc distance between God and us. that we can in no way assess his government
of the world hy means of a theodicy; J. Severijn, Principia: Wijsgerige inleiding in de gods-
dienstwetenschap (Utrecht 1938). Cf. on Visscher. the dissertation of B J. Wiegeraad. Hugo
Visscher, Leiden 1991 (which hardly mentions his responsibility for the philosophy of relig-
ion!).
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our religious beliefs. In Loen's six books and some forty articles, he elab-
orated this thesis in various ways.45 His main work. De Vaste Grond, ex-
plores the implications of the belief in the creative Word of God as the
ground of all existence, being and knowing for fundamental questions in
anthropology, ontology and epistemology (or 'gnoseology' as he called it).
Loen rejected the doctrine of analogy, and argued that only the divine
revelation can be the source of (philosophical) truth. It is clear that he
conceived the genitive case in 'philosophy of religion' as a subjective
genitive. Far from being religion's antagonist, philosophy can only fulfil
its task in service of religion, grounding every domain, every academic
discipline in the Word of God. Theology is the only discipline which is
excluded from philosophical reflection, since all philosophy starts from a
theological apprehension of the divine Word. Apart from the Barthian
tendencies which are manifest here, Loen was also influenced by the exis-
tentialist philosophy current in his time. Nevertheless, he was widely recog-
nized as one of the most original and thorough-going Dutch philosophers
of his time. In part as a result of his rather dense style of writing he had
few followers, most of them in South-Africa.
It would be exaggerated to see Vincent Brummer as one of these fol-
lowers, but certainly Briimmer came to the Netherlands in order to write
his dissertation with Loen. Loen offered him the right combination of
nearness and distance to determine his position with regard to Herman
Dooyeweerd's Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, which was very influ-
ential in South-Africa at the time. But Loen, being an independent and
systematic thinker himself, urged Brummer to go beyond a critical descrip-
tion of Dooyeweerd's thinking, and to develop new philosophical insights
of his own in the second half of the dissertation. Briimmer succeeded to
cope with this task, but in doing this he realized that what he needed was
a more extensive philosophical apparatus, a method of doing philosophy
(rather than constructing 'a philosophy') which could be applied to many
different contexts. This apparatus he found in British analytical philosophy,
to which he was introduced by Ian Ramsey with whom he studied in Ox-
ford in 1961.46 Thus, in his influential handbook on 'philosophy for theolo-
" See on Loen, K. Doevendans, Inleiding tol het denken van A.E. Loen (Assen 1989).
** Cf. Vincent Brummer, 'Kronkels in mijn denkweg', in: Gijsbert vart den Brink, Luco
J. van den Brom & Marce! Sarot (eds.), Wijsgerige theologie in beweging (Utrecht 1992), 11,
13f.
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„_ __ he worked out his method of conceptual analysis and applied it
tocireas of axiology, epistemology and ontology. Later on, he applied it to
more inherently theological themes such as prayer, the personhood of God
and the love of God.48 ^ ι ^
in this way, philosophy of religion was practised in Utrecht as philo-
sophical theology. As in Loen, philosophy of religion is not theology's
antagonist but its ally - though at times a critical ally. The philosophical
method of conceptual analysis is used to elucidate .the presuppositions and
implications of religious belief claims. It is definitely not used to ground
or prove those religious beliefs; in this way, Brummer's enterprise is non-
foundationalist and (in a sense) post-modern in character.49 Recently Brum-
mer adds a hermeneutical accent to this analytical one. He argues that it is
also an important task of philosophical theology to elaborate innovative
conceptual proposals with regard to the belief contents of the faith, in
constant dialogue both with the past and with the demands of our own
time.
Some of Brummer's pupils have applied his method of conceptual analy-
sis in other areas, especially in the doctrine of God. Antonie Vos (senior
lecturer in systematic theology in Utrecht) was the first of these with his
dissertation on divine knowledge and the contingency of the world. He was
followed by Luco J. van den Brom (now professor in systematic theology
in Groningen), Gerrit Immink (now professor in practical theology in U-
trecht). Marcel Sarot and Gijsbert van den Brink (both lecturers in philos-
ophy of religion in Utrecht), with studies on respectively the doctrines of
divine omnipresence, simplicity, (im)passibility and omnipotence.50 In
coming years a new research programme will be developed in which the
method of conceptual analysis will be applied to a new field, namely that
47 Wijsgerige begripsanalyse, Kampen 1975, 19954; translated into English as Theology
and Philosophical Inquiry, London 1981.
41 What are we Doing when we Pray? (London 1984), Speaking of a Personal God
(Cambridge 1992). The Model of Love (Cambridge 1993).
49 For a more detailed description of the method of philosophical theology which has been
used in Utrecht, see the paper I wrote together with Marcel Sarot, 'De nieuwere wijsgerige
theologie1 in G. van den Brink & Marcel Sarot (eds.), Hoe is uw Naam ? Opstellen over de
eigenschappen van God (Kampen 1995), 7-32.
50 See Vos, Kennis en Noodzakelijkheid (Kampen 1981 ), van den Brom, Divine Presence
in the World (Kampen 1993), Immink, Divine Simplicity (Kampen 1987), Sarot, God,
Feasibility and Corporeality (Kampen 1992), van den Brink, Almighty God (Kampen 1993).
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of identity and change in religious traditions. This does not mean, however,
that the Utrecht research on the doctrine of God will be discontinued.
Philosophy of religion has been taught in Amsterdam by S. Hoekstra (1867-
1892), IJ. de Bussy (1892), HJ. Groenewegen (1916), A.H. de Hartog
(1931), N.J. Westendorp Boerma (1939), W. Leendertz (1945)", J.A. Oos-
terbaan (1954-1978) and A.F. de Jong (1980-1991). ïn 1991 the chair was
abolished in a reorganisation of the faculty( and philosophy of religion is
now taught by a senior lecturer, Victor Kal. Most of the people in this list
were Mennonites. There is a historical link between the faculty and the
Mennonites since 1892, when the Mennonites together with the Lutherans
prevented the faculty from being closed by the local authorities, by each
putting forward two candidate-professors from their faculty-allied Amster-
dam seminaries. One of the two Mennonite professors was De Bussy, who
was an ethicist more than a philosopher of religion, and apart from De
Hartog and Westendorp Boerma his successors have been Mennonite as
well.52 Few of them, however, concentrated on the philosophy of religion.
De Hartog was famous for his apologetic gifts, which he developed in
confrontation with modern atheism; he devised an all-embracing metaphys-
ical theology, in which he downplayed the particularities of Christianity
and took his starting point in the doctrine of analogy.5'
J.A. Oosterbaan concluded from the fact that since 1963 philosophy of
religion was taught not only in the philosophical but also in the theological
faculties, that nothing was wrong with taking 'religion' not only as the
ι £Λ> subject but also as the efeject of philosophy of religion. Thus, the philos-
ophy of religion can be seen as that part of systematic theology, which
attempts to conceptually expound its contents as clearly as possible. Instead
of elaborating this conception into a distinctive method (as we saw was
done in Utrecht), Oosterbaan goes on to combine both views of philosophy
of religion by defining the discipline as 'the totality of the dialogue be-
tween philosophy and religion or faith', in which both relate critically to
51 Cf. F. Sassen, Wijsgeerig leven in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 19472),
140.
Ά I am indebted lo prof. A.F. de Jong for his kind information on the history of his
former chair.
" A.]. Rasker, De Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk vanaf 1795 (Kampen I9863), 250f.
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each other, so that philosophy can become religious and theology philo-
sophical.54
In accordance with this definition, the Amsterdam way of doing philos-
ophy of religion is characterized by dialogues with different modern conti-
nental philosophers on the nature of religious belief and the status of its
truth claims. In these dialogues, Leendertz concentrated on Kierkegaard,
Oosterbaan on Hegel, his successor De Jong on Heidegger55 and to a les-
ser extent on Althusser and Levinas.
In Nijmegen philosophy of religion has been taught in combination with the
science of religion by J.P. Steffes (1923-1927), K.L. Beilon (1928-1957),
E.J.MJ.H. Cornells (1958-1980) and W. Dupré (1980-). Steffes and Corné-
lis were primarily scientists of religion; Bellon and Dupré, both prolific
writers, developed both parts of their chair. Bellon ascribed a twofold task
to the philosophy of religion: it has to study the causes or factors which
have prompted and fostered the religious life of humanity, and it has with
the help of metaphysics to make judgments on the truth and value of con-
crete religious beliefs and attitudes.56 A convinced thomist, Bellon distin-
guished between theology as the supranatural science of religion and com-
parative religious studies as the natural science of religion. The latter
should lay the basis for the former, by establishing the origin and spread
of the idea of God throughout concrete religions. In contrast to his protes-
tant counterpart G. van der Leeuw, Bellon defined religion rather narrowly,
insisting that a personal relation with a personal godhead is always present
in religion. Where we encounter religion, we also encounter the insight that
our reality is not grounded in itself, but depends upon a higher reality
which is of a personal nature Although nothing is proved by this, it so
neatly points towards a divine primeval revelation that reductionist
accounts of religion can be safely rejected.57
Cornells' studies of religion were much less inspired by apologetical
motives. Rather, Cornells inquired into concrete religions such as buddhism
M J.A. Oosterbaan. 'Wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst', 166f.
!! A.F. de Jong, Een wijsbegeerte van het woord: Een godsdienstwijsgerige studie over
de taalbeschouwing van Martin Heidegger (Amsterdam 1966).
56 K.L. Beilon. Godsdienstwijsbegeerte (Nijmegen 1934). 128; cf. the definitions of De
Vos and Hubbeling Both Groningen and Nijmegen have strong traditions in religious studies.
57 See on the philosophical significance of Bellon. Smiyker Boudier. Op zoek naar zijn
en zin, 197-202.
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and hinduism in order to compare their intentions as objectively as possible
with those of Christianity. In his latest work, he even tends towards a
synthesis of buddhist and Christian anthropology.58
Dupré combines Cornells' open attitude towards concrete religions with
Bellon's strenuous philosophical search for what religion really is. The
latter search is the central theme of Dupré's introduction to the philosophy
of religion.39 To the philosophy of religion belong the many different
kinds of general questions which can be raised with regard to the nature of
religion, the science of religion and the relations between religion and
philosophy. For Dupré, one thing is absolutely clear: religion cannot be ab-
stracted from culture. Therefore, Dupré asks for a 'culture-ontological'
analysis of 'the religion that there is' (to use his Hegelian terminology).
The philosopher of religion must try to stand in between the different
cultures and compare the 'patterns of meaning' which are unfolded in
different religious traditions.60 Dupré does not want to make a choice in
the dilemma of whether this work has to be done 'from the inside' or 'from
the outside'. Rather, since human beings are necessarily religious (!), we
necessarily share both the insider and the outsider perspective." Although
he is not particularly clear on this, it seems that Dupré pleads for some
kind of interaction between the two in the philosophical study of religion.
In his latest book, Dupré also discusses the contribution of religious studies
to the promotion of inter-cultural inter-religious dialogues. Earlier he wrote
about religion in primitive cultures, and published a dissertation and a
number of articles on the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, whose works he and
his wife edited in a three volume Latin-German edition.
The founder of Amsterdam's Free University, Abraham Kuyper, considered
the philosophy of religion as a distinctly non-theological, philosophical
discipline which nevertheless could be of help for theology. Its task is to
describe the essence of religion, to reflect upon its connections with other
phenomena which have a place in the human consciousness, and 'to get to
" Cf. Struyker Boudier, De dominicanen (Wijsgerig leven Π) (Nijmegen 1986), 123.
!9 Einführung in die Religionsphilosophie (Stuttgart 1985); cf. on this book Adhaanse's
survey, 'Godsdienstwijsgerig onderzoek', 318, 325f.
60 W. Dupré, Patterns of Meaning (Kampen 1994).
41 Dupré, 'Tussen binnen en buiten'. Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 34 (1984), 229;
in this article, Dupré explains his views on the nature and tasks of the philosophy of religion
(although unfortunately in a rather dense and difficult style).
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know the history of religion in the light of its idea'6'. This is not a neutral
enterprise; the difference between true and false religion cannot be ignored,
and the Christian believer should do philosophy of religion from a Chris-
tian perspective. Despite this-margfiml role which Kuyper gave the philos-
ophy of religion in the theological faculty, in practice biblical and dogmatic
theology had such a central place that hardly any philosophical work was
being done.63
This situation changed when G.E. Meuleman was .appointed in 1959 at
the newly erected chair for philosophy of religion. It is hardly surprising
that we find in his work an on-going reflection upon encyclopedic issues
like the nature of theology, the relations between natural theology, philos-
ophy and apologetics etc. Like his Amsterdam colleague Oosterbaan, Meu-
leman defined the philosophy of religion as the place where theology
should communicate with philosophy. He himself conducted this dialogue
in his publications on e.g. Blondel, Pascal, Schleiermacher and process
thought. Both theology and philosophy make their truth claims, and it is
important to relate these to each other. In line with Kuyper, Meuleman
argued that in doing this the philosophy of religion as it is exercised in a
theological setting should recognize the authority of the biblical revela-
tion.64
Whether Meuleman's successor H.M. Vroom would still subscribe to this
view is not so clear from his publications. The main emphasis in his re-
search is on inter-religious dialogue. The nature of his many contributions
in this field can perhaps best be described as 'comparative philosophy of
religion'. In an extensive study which has been translated into English6?
Vroom compares the different concepts of truth as they function in the five
world religions. He treats Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic thought with great
respect, and tries to develop a hermeneutical sensitivity to much more
existential notions of truth than our Western one. At the same time, he
argues that there is much overlap between the different religious traditions.
K A. Kuyper, Encyclopaedic der heilige Godgeleerdheid ΠΙ {Kampen 19092), 277νν.
Η Cf. J. Klapwijk, 'Honderd jaar filosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit', in: M. van Os &
W.J. Wierenga (eds.). Wetenschap en rekenschap 1880-1980, Kampen 1980, 528-593, esp.
578f.; cf. on Kuyper 532-542, on his counterpart H. Bavinck 546-551.
64 G.E. Meuleman. 'De wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst in de theologische faculteit',
Kondom het Woord 16 (1974), 96.
65 H.M. Vroom, Religions and the Truth: Philosophical Reflections and Perspectives
(Grand Rapids 1989).
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In a more recent second volume on the theme of 'religions and the truth',
Vroom inquires into the reasons why a person who has read extensively on
other religions would continue to be a Christian, in the course of this book
he elaborates an inclusivist position in the theology of religions.66' In his
latest book Vroom argues that religious traditions will continue to play a
central role in the structuring of our present-day pluralist society. Liberal
and pragmatic philosophers should not overlook this fact. We will need the
Christian religion next to others as 'the soul of Europe'.67 From a similar
perspective, Wessel Stoker, part-time lecturer in philosophy of religion next
to Vroom, has recently compared secular responses to the human quest for
meaning in life with the Christian view of life.68
As in Belgium, a large number of philosophers in the Netherlands who are
not officially or specifically involved in the philosophy of religion, have
nevertheless made many important and influential contributions to the field.
I would like to end this survey by briefly referring to some of them.
From the Catholic side. Ad Peperzak, who has been a professor for
philosophy at five different universities, H.H. Berger (Tilburg) and most
recently Ludwig Heyde (Nijmegen) have approached the philosophy of
religion from the point of view of metaphysics, relating the essence of
religion to the human quest for meaning.w Bergers accent on metaphysics
is continued in Tilburg by his successor B. Vedder, whereas in Utrecht
P.H.A.I. Jonkers is connecting religion and philosophy from a similar
perspective. Henk van Luyk (Amsterdam), on the other hand, opted for the
point of view of ideological criticism. From the protestant side, Theo de
Boer aroused much discussion with a specific revitalization of the Harnack-
thesis. De Boer argues, that the 'small story' of the original gospel of the
humility of God in Christ has been suppressed by the onto-theological
66 H.M. Vroom, No other Cods: Christian Belief in Dialogue with Buddhism, Hinduism,
and Islam (Grand Rapids 1996).
61 H.M. Vroom, Religie als zie! van de cultuur (Kampen 1996).
61 W. Stoker, Is vragen naar zin vragen naar God? (Zoetermeer 1993).
M H.H. Berger, Vragen naar zin: Een nieuwe inleiding in de metajysiek (Tilburg 1986);
Ad Peperzak, Zoeken naar zin: Proeven van wijsbegeerte (Kampen 1990), see esp. 80-106
for his view on the lask of philosophy of religion. Ludwig Heyde, Het gewicht van de eindig-
held (Meppel 1996). On Berger and Heyde, see Smiyker Boudier, Op zoek, resp. 323-332,




tradition, and that the predominance of the God of the philosophers over
the God of Pascal is the main cause of Western secularization.70 Willem
B. Drees of the Free University's 'Bezinningscentrum' is the most import-
ant (though not uncontroversial) writer on the relations between science
and religion. In his latest book, he defends a bluntly naturalist position on
the theme.71 René van Woudenberg tries to reach a breakthrough from the
Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea in which he was trained at the Free
University's philosophy department, and which tended to become a philo-
sophical world in its own, both towards the North-American movement in
philosophy of religion known as 'Reformed epistemology' and towards the
Utrecht way of doing philosophical theology; in his recent work he finds
himself inspired by philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolters-
torff (who held a part-time chair at the Free University's philosophical
faculty from 1985-1991) and Vincent Brummer.71
3) Concluding remarks: The complex academic situation of philosophy of
religion at Dutch universities is mirrored in its methodological and material
diversity. Up to the middle of the eighties the situation was in many cases
not so much that mutually exclusive answers were given to philosophical
questions with regard to religion, but that totally different questions were
being asked and answered. To a large extent there was no common field of
debate, and theories which were expounded were highly incommensurable.
Nowadays, the government is exerting more and more pressure on the
different faculties to cooperate in research and post-graduate teaching. As
a result, philosophers of religion meet each other regularly and have to
explain the relevance of their own methods and manners to each other. It
seems to be the case that this is bringing about a rise in mutual understand-
ing. At least not all philosophers of religion from different backgrounds
continue to behave like ships passing in the night. Thus for example com-
70 Theo de Boer, De God van de filosofen en de God van Pascal (Zoetermeer 1989),
1995'; cf. the collection of responses in H.M. Vroom (ed.), De Cod van de filosofen en de
God van de Bijbel.
71 Willem B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge 1995).
13 René van Woudenberg, Gelovend denken (Amsterdam 1992).
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munication between the Leiden- and the Utrecht-tradition in philosophy of
religion has improved considerably."
It seems to me that the methodological diversity in Dutch philosophy of
religion is at least partially due to three factors. First, since the Netherlands
lies at the crossroads of the three culturally leading countries of Western
Europe, philosophical influences from Germany, France and the U.K. were
incorporated in different degrees and proportions. Second, the Netherlands
has not produced any central figure in the philosophy of religion whose
genius was so uniquely impressive, that everyone had to relate to him or
her (either positively or negatively). In this regard, the situation differs
from that in Denmark (Sören Kierkegaard) and Sweden (Anders Ny-
gren).74 Third, Dutch philosophy of religion has a strong systematic incli-
nation. Many individual philosophers of religion have written their own
introduction to the discipline in which they elaborate their own solutions
to their self-proclaimed problems, rather than building on the work of their
colleagues and predecessors. Interesting examples of this procedure we
found in the work of H. de Vos, A.E. Loen, H.J. Heering, V. Brummer,
H.G. Hubbeling and W. Dupré.75 Sometimes the best one can find in
terms of inter-academic dialogue is a short appendix with references to
work which is being done by others in the field.76
One might wonder whether this individualism is responsible for the lack
of school-formation in the field. The work of quite a number of philos-
ophers of religion seems to have become forgotten after their death. A
71 Cf. H.J. Adriaanse, 'Four reasons to become nervous and two possible remedies', in:
G. van den Brink, L.J van den Brom & M. Sarot (etis.), Christian Faith and Philosophical
Theology (Kampen 1993), 1-21. This article on the work of Vincent Brummer, shows bcah
disagreement ond-afeo a common field of debate.
'* Cf. Svend Andersen, 'Philosophy of Religion in Denmark', in: Andersen (ed.). Tradi-
tional Theism and its Modern Alternatives (Aarhus 1994), 204ff.; Anders Jeffner, 'Philosophy
of Religion in Sweden and Finland: A Survey', Andersen (ed.), Traditional Theism. 216ff.
7S De Vos, Inleiding, De Vos, Wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst, Loen, Inleiding tot de
wijsbegeerte (Den Haag 1947); Brummer, Wijsgerige begripsanalyse', Heering, Inleiding',
Hubbeling, Denkend geloven: inleiding tot de wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst (Assen 1976;
a revised edition was published in German: Einflihrung in die Religionsphilosophie, Gottingen
1981); Dupré, Einführung in die Religionsphilosophie.
"E.g. Brummer, Begripsanalyse. 290-292; Hubbeling, Denkend geloven, 133-140. The
most extreme example of this is no doubt to be found in the work of Loen. Loen once con-
fessed that me positions which he analyzed and criticized in his work were most often not
historical examples at all, bue conceptual possibilities which he had constructed himself See
Brummer, 'Kronkels in mijn denkweg'. 12.
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usual procedure was that newly appointed philosophers of religion started
to pay some tribute to the qualities of thetr predecessors' work, and subse-
quently choose their own way, retaining at most a few isolated insights
from their predecessors. Arguably, they could hardly be blamed for this,
since they were not provided with a coherent methodological framework
within which a certain type of research could be continued and elaborated.
It just was not clear how to do philosophy of religion apart from develop-
ing your own private philosophy. So however brilliant, their predecessors
work may have been, it didn't prove fertile.
I think it can be said without bias, that Vincent Brummer has been the
first who succeeded in realizing an important breakthrough in this regard.
His application of the philosophical method of conceptual analysis to the
field of systematic theology proved remarkably fruitful, inspiring a number
of younger scholars and engendering much type-like research.77 In recent
years, this research-group has become internationally known as the 'Utrecht
school of philosophical theology'. Since in our present-day academic set-
ting we can no longer afford to have individual scholars who work out their
individual programmes, we may hope that this trend of common methodo-
logical orientation and substantial co-operation will become dominant in
the future in other branches of Dutch philosophy of religion as well. The
foundation of a Dutch society for the philosophy of religion in 1995 (Ne-
derlandse Vereniging voor Godsdienstwijsbegeene, based in Groningen), in
which also Belgian philosophers participate, is a hopeful sign in this re-
spect.
Let me end with a final personal observation. In his survey of ten years
philosophy of religion in the Netherlands, Adriaanse distinguishes between
eight different topics of research (God, the world, the soul, religion, theol-
ogy, culture, language, and historical issues).7* This division mirrors the
diversity of research in Dutch philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, it is
clear already from Adriaanse's survey that there is much overlap between
these different research themes. This is the case, I would suggest, because
in the end all these themes have their centre in one single theme which
continues to form the core of any research in the philosophy of religion,
viz. God. Of all the studies mentioned above, however widely diverse and
77 A collection with seven samples of this type of research is in Van den Brink & Sarot
(eds.). Hoe is uw Noam ?.
71 Adriaanse, 'Godsdienstwijsgerig'onderzoek'. 315-331.
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divergent they are. there is not one which does not either directly or in-
directly deal with God in his relations to the world and to human beings.
If the soul, culture, language, theology etc. are studied in the philosophy
of religion, it in the end always turns out to be with one question in mind:
what is said and can be said about God from this particular perspective?
God, in other words, is, has been and no doubt ever will be the sole thernj
really worth pondering about in the philosophy of religion.
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